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Exploring New Paradigms in Mental Health and Capacity Law: Persons, Populations, 
and Parity of Esteem 
 




This paper examines key contemporary policy and legal agendas regarding mental health, with a view to 
highlighting contributions that may be brought from new and emerging discourses in academic health law. In 
particular, it will do so from the perspective of the related fields of public health law and human rights law. Whilst 
core definitions of public health speak to questions regarding mental health and wellbeing, recent reports from a 
range of professional and advocacy organisations urge the message that mental health remains a neglected area of 
concern. This has led to an emphasis on the field of public mental health as a discrete area of study, policy, and 
practice. We argue and explain how the related field of public mental health law should be conceptualised and 
operationalised. This entails an examination of the fundamental requirement of law to support and promote good 
mental health, with a renewed focus on prevention and proactive intervention rather than reactive measures. We 
suggest that a framing made by reference to human rights models well support the combined ethical and practical 
commitments that must be met by public mental health law. 
 




Mental disorders are among the most prevalent diseases worldwide.1 Recent figures on the scale 
of mental ill health are staggering. The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that 
mental health problems account for more disability adjusted life years lost than cancer or 
cardiovascular disease.2 Depression is the predominant mental health problem, followed by 
anxiety, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder.3 Huge rises are anticipated in the number of people 
with dementia and Alzhemier’s disease over the next 20-30 years, linked to the rapidly ageing 
world population. Mental ill health is now regarded as a major public and global health issue.4  
 
In the UK, the figures are equally startling. The most recent Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey 
of Mental Health and Wellbeing revealed that almost one in five people in England aged 16 and 
over showed symptoms of anxiety or depression, and nearly half of adults (43.4%) believe that 
they have had a diagnosable mental health condition at some point in their life.5 There are 
                                                 
* Professor of Law; Co-Director, Centre for Health, Law, and Society, University of Bristol Law School, UK; 
Honorary Member, UK Faculty of Public Health; John.Coggon@bristol.ac.uk. 
** Professor of Mental Health Law, Rights and Policy; Co-Director, Centre for Health, Law, and Society, University 
of Bristol Law School, UK, J.M.Laing@bristol.ac.uk. 
We would like to express our strong gratitude to colleagues for feedback on an earlier version of this paper at the 
launch event of the Centre for Health, Law, and Society (CHLS) in Bristol in October 2017, and to participants at 
the CHLS roundtable on ‘Public Mental Health Law’ in April 2018. We are also extremely grateful to the two 
reviewers of the paper for their detailed and insightful comments on an earlier draft. 
1  Theo Vos et al, ‘Global, regional, and national incidence, prevalence, and years lived with disability for 301 acute 
and chronic diseases and injuries in 188 countries, 1990–2013: A systematic analysis for the Global Burden of 
Disease study’ (2013) The Lancet 386:9995, 743–800.  
2 Located at WHO, Mental disorder and substance use located at www.who.int/gho/publications/mdgs-sdgs/MDGs-
SDGs2015_chapter7.pdf?ua=1, accessed 12 December 2018. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. See also Dementia: a public health priority (Geneva: World Health Organization; 2012) < 
www.who.int/mental_health/publications/dementia_report_2012/en/>, accessed 12 December 2018 
5 The survey takes place every 7 years and the latest version was published in September 2016. Located at 
<https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey> accessed 
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indications that the incidence of mental ill health has been rising steadily over the last two 
decades, especially in women.6 This may be due to people being more willing to report and admit 
to having a mental health problem, but environmental, social and economic conditions are key 
contributing factors to the increase in many conditions.7 
 
In spite of vast evidence on the prevalence and disabling impact of mental ill-health, and 
although there has been progress in some countries, the WHO’s Mental Health Atlas 2017 reveals 
that there is a global shortage of workers trained in mental health and a lack of investment in 
mental health planning, programmes, and services.8 This is bolstered by data from a range of 
other sources. For example, treatment provision for depression globally is low, and surveys 
indicate that less than half of people living with depression receive any treatment.9 There are 
significant challenges, which have led to a huge ‘treatment gap’ between physical and mental ill 
health, where up to 9 out of 10 people across the world do not receive even basic mental health 
care in some countries. It is clear that, on a global scale, mental health continues to be neglected, 
and investment in crucial services is not happening quickly enough. Failure to invest in mental 
health has personal, social, and economic costs on a vast scale.10 
 
Moreover, relevant regulatory frameworks in many countries are highly reactive and ineffective 
in promoting access to timely or universal mental health care or treatment, less still in positively 
promoting conditions for good mental health and well-being. The Atlas indicates that less than 
half of Member States’ domestic mental health laws and policies comply fully with relevant 
international human rights standards.11 Unsurprisingly, these deficiencies have been described as 
a “failure of humanity” and led to some of the worst human rights abuses in the history of global 
health.12  An appreciation of this global context is essential to underline that there are key rights 
in need of protection, many of which are shaped by social and economic conditions.13 
 
Organisations including the Mental Health Foundation and Faculty of Public Health in the UK 
have been exploring and prioritising new approaches to tackling this ‘failure’. In 2016, they 
published a joint report, entitled Better Mental Health for All, which makes it clear that mental 
health problems are as much a public health issue as physical disorders/illness, and that we need 
to shift the focus away from the current reactive and individual responses, to methods of public 
                                                 
12 December 2018. See also Mental Health Foundation, Fundamental Facts about Mental Health 2016 located at 
<www.mentalhealth.org.uk/publications/fundamental-facts-about-mental-health-2016> accessed 12 December 
2018. 
6 Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing, England, 2014 (National Statistics, 2016) p. 5. For 
example, the Psychiatric Morbidity surveys in England show a 15% increase (from 24% in 2007 to 39% in 2014) of 
adults aged 16-74 with conditions such as anxiety or depression accessing mental health treatment. Located at 
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/adult-psychiatric-morbidity-survey, accessed 13 
December 2018. 
7 Ibid. See also John Coggon, ‘Depression and Public Health Law: Ethics, Governance, and the Socio-Political 
Determinants of Health and Well-being’ in Charles Foster and Jonathan Herring (eds), Depression: Law and Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); ‘What is depression and why is it rising?’, The Guardian, (2 June 2018) 
located at www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/04/what-is-depression-and-why-is-it-rising, accessed 12 
December 2018. 
8 Located at www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/atlas/mental_health_atlas_2017/en/, accessed 12 December 
2018. 
9 Philip S. Wang, et al., ‘Use of mental health services for anxiety, mood, and substance disorders in 17 countries in 
the WHO world mental health surveys’ (2007) Lancet 370:9590, 841–50.  
10 Dr Shekhar Saxena, Director of WHO’s Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse, located at 
www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/atlas/atlas_2017_web_note/en/, accessed 12 December 2018. 
11 At p. 16, located at www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/atlas/mental_health_atlas_2017/en/, accessed 12 
December 2018. 
12 Arthur Kleinman, ‘Global mental health: a failure of humanity’ (2009) Lancet 374:9690, 603-604. 
13 Brendan D. Kelly, Mental illness, human rights and the law (London: R C Psych Publications, 2016), p. 215.  
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health prevention, promotion, and early intervention. This includes a focus on creating 
environments in which people can enjoy positive mental well-being, rather than merely avoid ill 
mental health: the report works with a concept of mental health that runs through a continuum 
that goes beyond the absence of disease.14 It concludes that: 
 
There is strong evidence that investment in the protection and promotion of mental 
wellbeing, including early intervention and prevention, improves quality of life, life 
expectancy, educational achievement, productivity and economic outcomes, and reduces 
violence, antisocial behaviour and crime. […] Strong evidence of the poor outcomes 
related to having a mental health problem means that prevention and early intervention 
need to be a priority. Equally, there is evidence that investing in the protection and 
promotion of mental wellbeing should be emphasised within public mental health.15 
 
The report advocates for new ways of thinking in order to “realise the full potential of public 
mental health”16 and reduce the burden of mental ill health. 
 
In this paper, we contribute to this narrative strategy and practical agenda by explaining how 
legal scholarship can provide new and meaningful ways of thinking about and contributing to 
public mental health.17 Just as we share the view that practice in this area should not be 
characterised as simply reactive to problems once they have arisen, so we envisage a concept of 
public mental health law that prospectively seeks to provide conditions for and protections of 
positive mental well-being, in addition to governance structures for reactive measures in 
instances where ill mental health does arise. We start, in the following section, by exploring the 
development of public health law and mental health law, and their relationship with the broader 
field of health law. This allows a critical understanding of the advances that we argue are required 
in scholarship. We then move to consider what legal foundations and approaches may promote 
and constrain public mental health, and what forms of law and regulation are engaged in public 
mental health law. We exemplify our discussion with reference to dementia, but consider our 
arguments here to have broad application and importance for priorities in health law as a field of 
study and practice. Our conclusion aims to provide a clearly delineated concept of public mental 
health law, and the rationale for its importance. 
 
2. Health Law as Medical Law; Mental and Public Health Law as Outliers? 
 
2.1 An Early Focus on Medicine and Law 
 
The current wave of scholarship on the relationships between health and law began with the 
practice of medicine as its primary concern.18 In a UK context, this is reflected by the focus of 
the earliest textbooks,19 such as JK Mason and Alexander McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics,20 
                                                 
14 Better Mental Health for All: A public health approach to mental health improvement (Mental Health Foundation/Faculty of 
Public Health) p. 13, located at <www.mentalhealth.org.uk/publications/better-mental-health-all-public-health-
approach-mental-health-improvement> accessed 12 December 2018. 
15 Ibid. p. 14. 
16 Ibid. p. 11. 
17 See also the recent special issue of Public Health Ethics, compiled by Diego Silva, Cynthia Forlini, and Carla Meurk, 
which explores public mental health ethics: Public Health Ethics (2018) Volume 11, Issue 2. 
18 For critique and rich historical context, see further Margaret Brazier and Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Whence and 
Whither “Modern Medical Law”?’, published in this special issue. 
19 But note that ‘medical law’ is still the chosen focus of some texts whose first editions came rather later, such as: 
Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) (first edition, 
2006); Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) (first edition 
2006); Jo Samanta and Ash Samanta, Medical Law, (2nd edn, London: Palgrave) (first edition, 2011). 
20 J. Kenyon Mason and R. Alexander McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, (1983). 
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Margaret Brazier’s Medicine, Patients, and the Law,21 and Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb’s Medical 
Law: Text and Materials.22 Critical historical reflections track the evolution of contemporary 
‘medical law’ as a phenomenon that emerged within or alongside the broader field of bioethics, 
which also took the doctor/patient relationship as its main point of focus since its emergence in 
the 1970s.23 This narrowing of the field is remarkable in part because, in principle, bioethics has a 
much wider reach than clinical medicine (and thus an interest that expands beyond situations 
involving the remediation of ill health within a medical or healthcare setting). The International 
Association of Bioethics, for example, defines its area of inquiry in the following terms: 
 
Bioethics is the study of the ethical, social, legal, philosophical and other related issues 
arising in health care and in the biological sciences.24 
 
This great breadth, which incorporates, for instance, environmental ethics, the ethics of 
biotechnological innovation, and animal ethics, was not reached through the overwhelmingly 
dominant debates and discourses of early bioethics. Although scholars of course examined those 
and other wider areas, health law, like bioethics more generally, primarily presented itself as 
distinctly medical in tone. The influence and allure of anti-medicalisation critiques, such as Ivan 
Illich’s Medical Nemesis,25 and the apparent conflation of biomedical ethics and bioethics writ large, 
meant that the central point of analysis was a universe in which one person—a patient—
interacted with one other person—a doctor—with critical inquiry attending to the boundaries of 
the former’s (moral) right to determine what treatments she should receive to serve her interests 
as she perceived these. 
 
That inquiry could have lain in other areas even within the reach of medicine was not missed as 
UK Medical Law developed. Consider the following extract from Joseph Jacob’s review of 
Kennedy and Grubb’s Medical Law: Text and Materials, published in 1990: 
 
[T]he particular commitments of the compilers are more implicit than expressed; but then 
it is one of the teacher’s tasks to draw these out. Kennedy and Grubb have not excluded 
much that law teachers may be expected to ask their students to read… If there is a major 
omission, it is the scant regard for what, with some understatement, can be called the 
paternalism of public health law – see their brief discussion of notifiable diseases (pp. 
110ff) and compulsory treatment under the Mental Health Acts (pp.112f) – which is part 
of the legacy of Chadwick and contrasts with the common law tradition. For this disregard, 
however, Kennedy and Grubb must be forgiven because neither public health law nor the 
regimes which replaced the Victorian Poor laws are their real concern.26 
 
The thrust of this observation is important in itself to our current project (see sections 2.2 and 
2.3, below), but also reflects a separate defining feature of health law: scholarship here has an 
                                                 
21 Margaret Brazier, Medicine, Patients, and the Law, (London: Penguin, 1987). 
22 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law: Text and Materials, (London: Butterworths, 1989). Although not a 
textbook, see also Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981). 
23 See further Ruth Chadwick and Duncan Wilson, ‘The Emergence and Development of Bioethics in the UK,’ 
Medical Law Review (2018) 26:2, 183-201; Duncan Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2014); Kenneth Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
24 See www.bioethics-international.org/work-progress/, accessed 9th August, 2018. 
25 Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine—Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health, (London: Marion Boyars, 1976). Note 
e.g. its impact on Ian Kennedy’s thinking: Ian Kennedy, ‘What is a Medical Decision?’ in Ian Kennedy, Treat Me 
Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988). 
26 The review is also of Dieter Giesen’s International Medical Malpractice Law see Modern Law Review (1990) 53, 280-282. 
It is worth noting that Jacob is himself author of Doctors and Rules: A sociology of professional values (London: Routledge, 
1988) (with an extended second edition published in 1999). 
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ongoing ‘self awareness’; it produces internal critiques of the boundary and coherence problems 
for the field.27 Jonathan Montgomery’s paradigm-shifting re-characterisation from medical law to 
health care law, notably as expounded in his textbook of that title published in its first edition in 
1997, is a prominent example.28 Montgomery explicitly provides practical rationales for the 
incorporation of broader theoretical commitments and practical points of concern than would be 
given by health law conceived simply as medical law: a need to look to health care systems, the 
role of institutions, the place of practitioners other than doctors, and the impact of health 
promotion measures outside of clinical medicine.29 
 
Over time, not least because of the influence of scholars such as Montgomery, the field has 
broadened to capture wider concerns still: bioethics and health law scholarship now boasts 
extraordinary reach in terms of critical and (inter)disciplinary approaches, applied to myriad areas 
of practical concern, such as animal law, artificial intelligence, enhancement, global and planetary 
health, and so on. We revisit some of these points as the paper progresses, as we argue for the 
value and importance of public mental health law as a part of and a contributor to the overall 
field of health law. But at this stage we aim to consider how the sharpening of the early 
paradigms of (modern) medical law constrained and led to (mis)characterisations of mental and 
public health: we will show in section 2.2 how mental health and public health came to be 
presented as ‘outliers’ in health law and bioethics. The early practical points of focus in medical 
law, as described above, provide the start of a rationale for this. To explain it fully, we need to 
consider next how the early framings of medical law create a distorting focal point with ‘the 
autonomous patient’, and then explain the impact of this in the galvanisation of received 
wisdoms and their implications for health law scholarship in the areas of mental and public 
health. 
 
2.2 ‘Empowerment’ and the Distorting Effect of the ‘Paradigm Patient’ 
 
The creation of medical law as characterised above was effectively the creation of a particular 
critical lens. This lens allowed a sharpened focus on a certain genus of questions such as: why 
and to what extent a patient should be informed before her consent to an intervention is 
considered meaningful; what reasons and considerations are relevant to a patient’s decision to 
make fatal refusals of treatment; in what circumstances might medical care be said to incorporate 
rights, for example, to receive euthanasia? This sharpened focus was achieved by developing 
paradigms that became received analytical assumptions embodied in the idea of the ‘autonomous 
patient’. This patient was an individual whose rights emanated from her being able and rightfully 
placed, once well informed (again by right), to determine her own interests. Decision-making in a 
medical context contained both questions of clinical judgment for which medical expertise was 
relevant, and questions of wider judgment and values (personal, familial, social, ethical, religious) 
that were not considered the preserve of the doctor.30 And overarching this was a broad 
scepticism—cynicism even—regarding ‘medicalisation’, wherein a dominant profession had 
                                                 
27 Cf e.g. Kenneth Veitch, The Jursidiction of Medical Law (Ashgate, 2017); Theodore Ruger, ‘Health Law’s Coherence 
Anxiety,’ (2008) Georgetown Law Journal 96, 625; John Coggon, What Makes Health Public? A critical evaluation of moral, 
legal, and political claims in public health (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), chapter 5; Anne-Maree Farrell, 
John Devereux, Isabel Karpin, Penelope Weller, Health Law: Frameworks and Context (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
28 Jonathan Montgomery, Health Care Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) (second edition published in 
2002). 
29 Ibid., chapter 1. 
30 Cf Ian Kennedy, ‘What Is a Medical Decision?’ in Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford 
University Press, 1991). 
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claimed ‘jurisdiction’ over questions that ought, it was understood, to be determined by 
individuals in the vindication of their own rights.31 
 
As a matter of logic, analytical points of focus such as ‘the autonomous patient’ clarify by 
simplifying: theories bring explanatory and critical potential at the cost of detail and nuance.32 Of 
necessity, the further a theory’s paradigms are from reality, the more distorting becomes the lens. 
Insofar as the starting points of critique allow settled and justified conclusions on questions such 
as (say) voluntary, active euthanasia for adults who are suffering unbearably and reaching an 
uncoerced decision, this is fine. But where (say) the paradigm patient is not reflective of the 
person under discussion (e.g. because she is not able to reach a decision on her best interests), or 
reflective of the practical context (e.g. because a preventive measure would need to be instituted 
at a population level and gaining individual consent is not even a theoretical possibility), we come 
into problems if our analysis is made by reference to ‘the autonomous patient’.33 
 
The simple response to such problems is to recognise the limits of the existing theoretical 
apparatus and develop appropriate machinery for critique that works with alternative, relevant 
and defensible paradigms.34 However, within the early days of medical law, it might be observed 
that for practical scenarios that fitted uncomfortably within the dominant paradigms, the 
problems seemed to be for the cases rather than for the theory, at least by default.35 In the 
current paper, it is pertinent to exemplify this by reference to mental health and public health, 
although other ‘outlier’ areas could equally be cited. As noted in Jacob’s review, quoted above, 
mental and public health were acknowledged only largely to be sidelined. They became outliers 
as a matter, essentially, of convention, even whilst they could have been incorporated more fully 
within health law as ‘medical law’. And this is of great significance because, by virtue of their 
exclusion, they were essentially placed in a position where defences of practice had to be made 
against uncritical acceptance of assumptions born of the paradigms of mainstream medical law. 
For mental health this is well represented by critiques framed as ‘medicalism’ versus ‘legalism’.36 
For public health the same is true by references to ‘healthism’ or ‘nanny statism’ versus individual 
right.37 And both mental and public health are united not just by reference to their relative 
neglect in mainstream medical law: they also share a number of a salient overlapping analytical 
concerns. In particular, both give rise to questions of the common good and the potential 
tensions between individual and public interests (e.g. in relation to measures generated in 
instances where an individual is considered to be a threat to the community); both draw in 
considerations of paternalism and intervention without consent (thus challenging the assumed 
wisdom of ‘the autonomous patient’ and her being positioned best to recognise her interests); 
and, as explored in section 3.2 of this paper, they invite similar forms of framing when we 
consider how they ought to be addressed. 
 
                                                 
31 See Illich, Medical Nemesis, above n. 25. 
32 Stephen R. Latham, ‘On Some Difficulties for Any Theory of Global Health Justice,’ in John Coggon and Swati 
Gola (eds), Global Health and International Community: Ethical, Political and Regulatory Challenges (Bloomsbury, 2013). 
33 John Coggon, ‘Would Responsible Medical Lawyers Lose Their Patients?’ Medical Law Review (2012) 20:1, 130-149; 
John Coggon, ‘Mental Capacity Law, Autonomy, and Best Interests: An Argument for Conceptual and Practical 
Clarity in the Court of Protection,’ Medical Law Review (2016) 24:3, 396-414. 
34 See Bruce Jennings, ‘Frameworks for Ethics in Public Health,’ (2003) Acta Bioethica 9:2, 165-176; Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, Public Health—Ethical Issues, (London: Nuffield, 2007), Introduction. 
35 Consider the critique provided in Angus Dawson, ‘The Future of Bioethics: Three Dogmas and a Cup of 
Hemlock,’ Bioethics (2010) 24:5, 218-225. 
36 As first described by Kathleen Jones, see Asylums and After: A revised history of the mental health services from the early 18th 
century to 1990 (London: Athlone Press, 1993). 
37 Petr Skrabanek, The Death of Humane Medicine and the Rise of Coercive Healthism (Social Affairs Unit, 1994); John 
Coggon, The Nanny State Debate: A Place Where Words Don’t Do Justice, (London: Faculty of Public Health, 2018) 
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The adversarial framing of competing principles or theoretical commitments that we characterise 
here may at first seem simplistic, but it is emblematic of the application of theory in practical 
questions concerning bioethics and health law.38 Medical law had the patient’s right to non-
interference secured as an almost unchallengeable ethical—and, if sometimes only in principle, 
legal—right.39 The duty to respect a patient’s entitlement to be treated only following free and 
informed consent became the cardinal principle (albeit that on the latter, the law somewhat 
lagged behind the ethics).40 In contrast, the concerns of mental health and public health were 
more challenging: respect for individual rights was placed at no less of a premium, but in a 
context where the rationales and justifications concerning the acceptability for treatments or 
interventions without consent were not the same. Even allowing that we might end up at the 
same conclusion—i.e. that intervention cannot be justified and protections of bodily integrity 
should be absolute—distinct theorising needed to be achieved. We move from a universe with 
just two people in it, and with our ethical source of concern just being one person (the 
autonomous patient), to a more complex social context, in which rejections of paternalism are 
not so straightforward (can we really accept that we are justified deferring to the individual’s 
perspective of what serves her interests?) and in which questions of the common good and 
impacts on others cannot be ignored (are the person’s individual interests exhaustive of our 
ethical concern?). 
 
The presumption towards gradations in the role of different principles (autonomy, welfare, the 
common good, etc.) that are prima facie required by mental and public health presents a contrast 
with the zero-sum absolutism of (say) autonomy versus paternalism in mainstream medical law. 
Even in the context of the paradigm patient, medical law has started to develop towards a less 
absolutist framing, accounting for empirical discourses on the realities of decision making, and 
critical accounts such as ‘relational autonomy’. But in the early days of modern medical law, the 
contrast was with the robust persona of the autonomous patient. The ill-suitedness of the 
paradigm patient in the context of mental health was clearly recognised, and noted, for example, 
by Phil Fennell, who wrote in 1990: 
 
There is now widespread acknowledgement of the folly of rigid insistence upon the 
ascendancy of patient autonomy over paternalism where the result would be harm to the 
patient. Paternalism is recognized as legitimate up to a certain point.41 
 
Similarly, in their leading textbook on Public Health Law, Lawrence Gostin and Lindsay Wiley 
reflect back on the dominant concerns of public health, indicating the contrast with mainstream 
medical law: 
 
Public health has historically constrained the rights of individuals and businesses to protect 
community interests. Whether through the use of reporting requirements affecting privacy, 
                                                 
38 Cf Michael Dunn and Charles Foster, ‘Autonomy and Welfare as Amici Curiae,’ Medical Law Review (2010) 18:1, 86-
95. 
39 Margaret Brazier, ‘Do No Harm—Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ Cambridge Law Journal (2006) 65:2, 
397-422; John Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable 
Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ Health Care Analysis (2007) 15:3, 235-255. 
40 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871; Chester v Afshar 
[2004] UKHL 41; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; General Medical Council, Consent: patients 
and doctors making decisions together (London: GMC, 2008); Anne Maree Farrell and Margaret Brazier, ‘Not so new 
directions in the law of consent? Examining Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,’ (2016) 42:2, 85-88; Rob Heywood 
and José Miola, ‘The Changing Face of Pre-operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the 
Matter,’ Law Quarterly Review [2017] 133, 296-321. 
41 Phil Fennell, ‘Inscribing Paternalism in the Law: Consent to Treatment and Mental Disorder,’ Journal of Law and 
Society (1990) 17:1, 26-51, 26. 
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mandatory testing or screening affecting autonomy, environmental standards affecting 
private property, industrial regulation affecting economic freedom, or isolation and 
quarantine affecting liberty, public health has not shied away from controlling individuals 
and businesses for the aggregate good.42 
 
It is clear that these wider contexts and concerns impact the basis of, and thus conclusions to, 
analysis. And we also see how the framing, when dominated by a medical law paradigm of self-
reliant individuals with indefeasible rights, is problematic from the start.43 Early medical law 
could triumph the autonomous patient, and consistently with this reduce the medical practitioner 
to a party whose role was limited to the competence afforded by a technical expertise that could 
not speak to final value judgments or what should ultimately be done to a patient for her own 
good without her express agreement. And the ‘universe’ in which this happened was largely 
confined to a clinical situation with no wider societal considerations at play. However, in mental 
health and public health, even at the level of theory, it could not without questionable 
assumptions be argued that such a position would hold.44 In both areas, inevitably value 
judgments external to those of the patient (or, given the broader contexts, person or citizen!) 
would be brought to bear on decisions that directly impacted the individual and her choices. On 
settled analysis, of course, we might argue that this is wrong: as libertarian scholars such as Szasz 
and Skrabanek did respectively in relation to mental and public health.45 But in the alternative, 
where concerns for well-being and welfare at individual and population levels arose, an 
alternative framing was needed. However, we see that the sort of gradations indicated, for 
example, in Fennell’s words directly above, contended with the settled wisdoms of medical law. 
 
2.3 Parallels and Paradigms in the Outlier Areas of Mental and Public Health Law 
 
The previous discussion has indicated that mental health and public health existed as outliers in 
two particular ways in health law. First, as a practical matter they suffered relative neglect in 
medico-legal scholarship. Of course, it is true that significant figures, such as Brenda Hale 
(Hogget), Phil Fennell, Lawrence Gostin, and Robyn Martin, were considering these fields as a 
whole, and specific questions within them: e.g., treatment without consent for psychiatric 
conditions; notifiable diseases. But measured by weight of scholarship, there was far less 
attention to these than was received by questions in clinical medicine such as informed consent, 
euthanasia, and so on. Second, and probably as a consequence, mental health and public health 
suffered neglect because settled conclusions on ‘the autonomous patient’ meant that the dice 
were loaded against analyses that could suitably accommodate concerns for autonomy and for 
welfare and the common good.46 
 
In short, the upshot of early modern medical law was a framing that contraposed medical 
paternalism/interference on the one hand with individual rights on the other. In regard to mental 
health and public health this was significant, and to a good extent valuable. An unbridled 
medicalism in mental health was demonstrably problematic, and greater legal protections for 
psychiatric patients overdue.47 Equally, public health measures—notably responses to 
                                                 
42 Lawrence O. Gostin and Lindsay Wiley, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (3rd edn, University of California 
Press, 2016), 11. 
43 Cf Jennings, ‘Frameworks for Ethics in Public Health,’ above n. 34. 
44 Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘Public Health: The ‘Population’ as Patient,’ in Catherine D. DeAngelis (ed), Patient Care and 
Professionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
45 Thomas Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry: An Inquiry into the Social Uses of Mental Health Practices (Syracuse University 
Press, 1989 [originally published 1963]); Skrabanek, The Death of Humane Medicine, above n. 37.  
46 Cf John Coggon, ‘Mental Capacity Law, Autonomy, and Best Interests,’ above, n. 33. 
47 Lawrence O. Gostin, A Human Condition Volume I: The Mental Health Act from 1959 to 1975: Observations, analysis and 
proposals for reform (London: MIND, 1975). 
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HIV/AIDS—clearly invited responses that recognised, respected, and protected individual 
rights.48 This was all the more important as the individuals under discussion were often members 
of vulnerable and/or otherwise disadvantaged or marginalised groups. Nevertheless, it allowed 
the enforcement of a perception that mental and public health were challenges to, and to be 
challenged by, human rights: the two fought against one another. And the apparent (moral) 
soundness of such a framing was underscored by the concern in bioethics and medical law to 
frame patients as autonomous rights-holders whose decision-making should not be interfered 
with, for their own good, by medical professionals or the state. A preponderance of citations of 
John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’ (generally with little regard for a wider discussion of On 
Liberty) came to serve as a knock-down argument: 
 
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. […] The only part 
of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.49 
 
The impact of this type of analysis is compounded by its apparent basis in civil and political 
rights: rights to be left alone, with little (perhaps no) concern being given to economic, cultural, 
and social rights. So again, the concerns that might underpin mental and public health 
interventions, are sidelined. In the next section, we explore and promote challenges to the 
paradigms that we have presented here, and consider their application in practice. Our argument 
rests on what we consider to be a better picture, in which mental and public health are framed as 
part of human rights, rather than oppositional to them. We aim to show how a coming together 
of a reconceived field of public mental health law can lead to a richer and more productive 
health law overall, not least in affording greater potential for achieving parity of esteem between 
mental and physical health. 
 
3. Beyond Restraint: Human Rights as a Framework for Action in Public Mental Health 
 
3.1 Emerging from the shadows: Mental health and parity of esteem 
 
Various narrative, advocacy, and analytical advances at the global level concerning mental health 
and human rights help to demonstrate how mental health is emerging from the shadows as a 
public health concern, and how human rights can play a key role in promoting preventive and 
population-level health improvement approaches to mental health. The WHO has helped to 
‘sharpen the focus’ on mental health in the last decade by launching the Mental Health Gap 
Action Programme (mhGAP),50 which aims to scale up services for mental disorders, especially 
for low- and middle-income countries. The Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health,51 launched in 
2010, supports new research to focus collective efforts on global mental health. These initiatives 
have been followed by commitments from Member States to combat mental ill health in the 
WHO Mental Health Action Plan 2013-20.52 
 
                                                 
48 Richard D Mohr, Gays/Justice: A study of ethics, society, and law (Columbia University Press, 1988). 
49 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (edited by Edward Alexander), (Broadview, 1999 [originally published 1859]). 
50 Located at https://www.who.int/mental_health/mhgap/en/, accessed 13 December 2018. 
51 See further Pamela Y Collins et al, ‘Grand challenges in global mental health,’ (2011) Nature 475:7534, 27-30. 
52 Located at http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/action_plan/en/, accessed 13 December 2018. 
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At a domestic level, focusing here on England, there are also factors contributing to the shift 
away from a reactive approach, towards preventive approaches to mental health and well-being. 
A recent review of mental health legislation has identified mental health as emerging “into the 
light”53 with an explicit commitment to achieving ‘parity of esteem’ and equal treatment for 
mental and physical ill health. To be realised, of course, such a commitment requires adequate 
bolstering at political (including economic), legal, social, and personal levels. And the first two of 
these are, we suggest, prerequisites to the sustainable achievement of the final two. 
 
At least on its face, it can be shown that the political climate has shifted to recognise the need for 
a population approach to tackle the risk factors and determinants of mental ill health, and to 
promote good mental health. Prime Minister Theresa May announced in 2017:  
 
[A] step-change in the way that we deal with these issues. I want to see mental health 
addressed not just in our hospitals, but in our classrooms and communities. I want to see 
the stigma stripped away so that no-one in this country feels unable to talk about what 
they’re going through or seek help. I want to see a focus on prevention as well as 
treatment, especially since so many adult mental health problems – which 1 in 4 of us will 
suffer from at any one time – begin in childhood.’54 
 
This political commitment is, to an extent, supported by legislation and government policy. The 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 introduced the first explicit duty on the Secretary of State to 
promote physical and mental health, and prevent, diagnose, and treat physical and mental ill 
health.55 This legal duty is reinforced by local authorities’ health improvement duties, as well as 
the Care Act 2014, which imposes a further duty on local authorities to promote individual well-
being, defined as including emotional, physical and mental health.56 And it is underscored 
politically by the NHS Constitution, which explains that the NHS “is designed to diagnose, treat 
and improve physical and mental health.”57 Additionally, the NHS England strategy published in 
2016, Five Year Forward View for Mental Health,58 is committed to working towards a more equal 
response across mental and physical health, and achieving parity between the two.  
 
However, we might question the real strength and impact of these political and legislative moves 
and commitments. An official report in 2017 has highlighted that, whilst there has been some 
encouraging early progress, there “remains a long distance to travel to achieve true parity.”59 It 
outlines the key foci for future development: to continue to invest in the mental health 
workforce and services, as well as preventive mental health approaches; and to promote a “fresh 
mindset” to tackle inequalities, stigma and discrimination. Moreover, the recent report of the 
independent review of the MHA has been equally critical of the lack of appropriate and 
preventive mental health services and support, although regrettably, it fell considerably short of 
                                                 
53 See The Independent Review of the Mental Health Act: Interim Report (1 May 2018) p. 5, located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/703919/The_
independent_Mental_Health_Act_review__interim_report_01_05_2018.pdf, accessed 13 December 2018. 
54 ‘Mental health problems are everyone’s problem: article by Theresa May’ (9 January 2017), located at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/mental-health-problems-are-everyones-problem-article-by-theresa-
may, accessed 13 December 2018. 
55 Health and Social Care Act 2012, s. 1(1). 
56 Ibid., s. 12;  Care Act 2014, ss.. 1(1) and 1(2). 
57 Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england, accessed 13 
December 2018. 
58 (February 2016) located at https://www.england.nhs.uk/mental-health/taskforce/, accessed 13 December 2018. 
59 https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fyfv-mh-one-year-on.pdf, accessed 13 December 
2018. 
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recommending a positive entitlements to support/treatment services and a complete overhaul of 
current mental health legislation.60  
 
The need for greater work at political and legal levels is underscored if we look at evidence at the 
social and personal levels. This suggests that attitudinal shifts are necessary if mental health is to 
be understood in parity with physical health, albeit that things appear to be moving in the right 
direction, as the recent independent review of the MHA report61 and Attitudes to Mental Illness 
2014 Research Report62 prepared for Time to Change63 demonstrate. There are some positive 
indications of greater levels of public understanding in England between 2008 and 2014, 
evidenced by the reported 9% increase in willingness to live with someone who has a mental 
health problem (from 57% to 66%); and a 7% increase in willingness to work with someone who 
has a mental health problem (69% to 76%). Moreover, 78% of respondents believed that for too 
long people with mental illness have been the subject of ridicule, and 95% believed that people 
with mental illness are subject to stigma and discrimination. Nevertheless, it is still worrying that 
over a third of survey respondents thought that people with a mental health problem are prone 
to violence, and only 40% would be comfortable speaking to their employer about a mental 
health problem. 
 
The Better Mental Health for All report, discussed in the introduction to this paper, provides 
further impetus to champion a fresh, more holistic approach (including preventive and health 
improvement measures), and highlights the need for legal and political support for this. The 
report recognises that current models are highly responsive, while effective prevention of illness 
and promotion of well-being require a different strategy: 
 
Interventions which focus on the positive have added value over those which focus on 
finding or preventing the negative. Promoting mental wellbeing moves the focus away 
from illness and is central to an individual’s resilience, social purpose, autonomy and 
ability to make life choices.64 
 
When considering the role of law here, both for its practical force and its expressive nature in 
regard to social values and priorities, it is worth emphasising that regulatory (especially legal) 
frameworks for mental health care and treatment in England are coercive, reactive, and very much 
focused on crisis intervention. For example, the admission and treatment provisions of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 (MHA) justify the use of compulsory care, triggered when mental health has 
                                                 
60 See The Independent Review of the Mental Health Act: Interim Report (1 May 2018) p. 5, located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/703919/The_
independent_Mental_Health_Act_review__interim_report_01_05_2018.pdf, accessed 13 December 2018. 
61 Modernising the Mental Health Act: Increasing choice , reducing compulsion: Final Report of the Independent Review of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 (December 2018) p. 7, located at https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/independent-review-of-
the-mental-health-act, accessed 13 December 2018. 
62 (April 2015) Located at https://www.time-to-
change.org.uk/sites/default/files/Attitudes_to_mental_illness_2014_report_final_0.pdf, accessed 13 December 
2018; see also Public Health England/National Centre for Social Research, Attitudes to mental health problems and mental 
wellbeing: Findings from the 2015 British Social Attitudes Survey  located at 
http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39109/phe-bsa-2015-attitudes-to-mental-health.pdf accessed 13 December 
2018. 
63 Time to Change is a growing social movement in the UK campaigning to improve attitudes and behaviour 
towards people with mental health problems, with the aim of eliminating mental health discrimination and stigma – 
see further https://www.time-to-change.org.uk. 
64 Better Mental Health for All: A public health approach to mental health improvement (London: Mental Health 
Foundation/Faculty of Public Health) p. 28, located at https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/publications/better-
mental-health-all-public-health-approach-mental-health-improvement, accessed 13 December 2018. 
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deteriorated to a point where it is of sufficient nature and severity to justify in-patient treatment.  
We do not for a moment wish to deny the importance of law in contexts of acute psychiatric 
illness, or the need for reform in this area in ways that allow real and meaningful involvement and 
participation of the persons who would be affected by such laws, as required by Article 4(3) of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). But the near-
exclusive emphasis lent by this overwhelmingly reactive approach allows the sidelining of some of 
the key risk factors for mental ill health, which occur throughout the life course and across 
communities and which also would benefit from the normative and practical support of legal, 
rather than just (potentially quite empty) political, commitments.65 Indeed, a report in 2018 by the 
Care Quality Commission in England into rising detentions under the MHA suggests that the 
ongoing rise in compulsory detentions (the number of detentions increased by 40% – from 45,484 
to 63,622 - between 2005/6 and 2015/16) may be symptomatic of a system under ‘considerable 
pressure’. The report attributes this to a number of factors, including declining access to 
community services and an increase in the prevalence of risk factors for detention, such as rising 
inequality, social exclusion and drug/alcohol misuse. 66  The status quo only sharpens the narrow 
lens to much analysis, and thus scholarly priorities, in health law described in section 2 of this 
paper. 
Let us therefore explore the wider landscape, and explain the broader space for law within it. 
Dahlgren and Whitehead argued several decades ago that susceptibility to mental health 
problems is determined by a combination of individual risk factors, influenced by settings, and 
broader socio-economic, cultural and political factors.67 There is also an important family 
dimension, as relationships moulded in formative years contribute to health and well-being in 
later life. This point is emphasised too in Better Mental Health for All: 
 
[T]he social, physical and economic environments in which people are born, grow, live, 
work and age have important implications for mental health.68 
 
Acceptance of these evidence-based concerns represents a shift away from the biomedical 
model, which has, until recently, dominated beliefs about physical and mental health and, as 
outlined above, the shape and scope of bioethics and health law. The biomedical model 
emphasises the genetic and biological causes of disease, with a consequent focus on 
pharmacological and clinical solutions: it is narrow and (generally) responsive. And accordingly, it 
ignores the impact of the social and environmental determinants of health, with a consequent 
failure to account for measures that are broader and pre-emptive. Traditionally, psychiatry has 
focused on treatment and ‘tertiary prevention’: i.e. slowing the progress of disease/disability.69  If 
health law is to serve mental as well as physical health, we need to move to framings that accord 
with growing scientific awareness of the role of mental health improvement and early detection, 
and acceptance of the need to develop interventions that might reduce the incidence of mental 
disorders.70 
 
                                                 
65 Cf also the distinction in conceptualisation of, and responses to, ‘crisis resolution’ as contrasted with ‘general 
support’ in Piers Gooding, Bernadette McSherry, Cath Roper, Flick Grey, Alternatives to Coercion in Mental Health 
Settings: A Literature Review (Melbourne: Melbourne Social Equity Institute, University of Melbourne, 2018). 
66 Care Quality Commission, Mental Health Act: The rise in the use of the MHA to detain people in England (London: 
January 2018) 4, 23.  
67 Göran Dahlgren and Margaret Whitehead, Policies and strategies to promote social equity in health, (Stockholm: Institute 
for Future Studies, 1991). 
68 Ibid. p. 9. 
69 Celso Arango et al, ‘Preventive strategies for mental health,’ The Lancet Psychiatry (2018) 5:7, 591-604. 
70 Ibid.  
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To do this, we cannot just rely on (healthcare) professionals’ understanding or capacity to 
intervene. Health law and policy are crucial precisely because many of the general risk factors for 
mental ill health, such as social exclusion and inequality, cannot be addressed by psychiatrists or 
clinicians. The same is true for the provision and maintenance of environments that promote 
positive well-being. A vast range of other specialists and institutions need to cooperate within a 
framework that allows shared means and agendas. This includes colleagues in primary health and 
social care, education, employment, housing, and community sectors. As Better Mental Health for 
All recognises:  
 
A truly multidisciplinary and inter-sectoral approach must be adopted as no one 
discipline has all the knowledge or power to effect the required level of change.71  
 
It is also imperative to put the voices of those with lived experience of mental ill health at the 
heart of legislative and policy responses, in line with the ethos of the CRPD. Service users are 
demanding a stronger commitment to early intervention and preventive approaches, as well as 
greater respect for and promotion of the right to (mental) health.72  
  
Within this new agenda there is a significant part for law to play, and thus a pivotal role for 
health law scholarship. Law’s fundamental value as a source both of empowering authority and 
institutional restraint makes it an essential, if understated, part of the solution. As indicated in 
this section, this comes both through law’s regulatory/coordination capacity, and its expressivist 
functions. We approach this analysis from a perspective of wishing to see legal methods of 
empowerment being developed alongside more widely discussed efforts for legal reform in 
relation to reactive laws on mental health, disability, and incapacity. As such, in the current 
paper, even whilst we draw from the advocacy and learning of the UN Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, we do not engage with questions of national legal reforms aimed at 
achieving equality before the law on the abolition of mental health laws (as these are framed, for 
example, within the UK).73 This is not because of a perceived unimportance to these topics, but 
because we are aiming to generate a wider research agenda too. A key point of the neglect of the 
sorts of interventions and measures that we are arguing for is that their less ‘profound’ nature 
leads to their being missed; and thus also the great good that may be done. We would forcefully 
advocate (and are doing so in other areas of our work) for the legal rights of persons who suffer 
discrimination in the enjoyment of their legal capacity. Here, however, we aim to explore the 
place of law in providing conditions for good mental health and well-being; looking beyond 
reactive methods of intervention and the place of law in relation to this. To do this, we will now 
argue that recent developments in international human rights law provide a particularly useful 
framework to represent and advance the need and approach that we have identified, and 
operationalise the field of public mental health law. 
 
3.2 Public health, mental health and human rights: Conflict or conflux? 
 
Better Mental Health For All, as we have shown, reinforces a new mindset, and the need to 
reconceptualise the relationships between health, mental health, and public health. As the report 
                                                 
71 Better Mental Health for All: A public health approach to mental health improvement (London: Mental Health 
Foundation/Faculty of Public Health) p. 28, located at https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/publications/better-
mental-health-all-public-health-approach-mental-health-improvement, accessed 13 December 2018. 
72 See for example National Survivor User Network, ‘Our voice our vision our values’ (Members’ manifesto, 2017), 
located at https://www.nsun.org.uk/our-manifesto, accessed 14th January 2019; Hearing Voices Network,  The 
Mental Health Act: An Alternative Review (December 2018) located at http://www.hearing-
voices.org/news/alternative-mental-health-act-review/, accessed 14th January 2019. 
73 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 (2014) (CRPD/C/GC/1, 2014), 
especially paragraphs 50-52. 
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makes clear, the time has come for us to “act in an empowering way to combat inequalities and 
the powerlessness that can accompany them.”74 We have explained how and why health law, 
broadly enough conceived, is an essential tool to work towards achieving those goals: law shapes 
and underpins the necessary socio-political infrastructures, and provides mechanisms for 
assuring that necessary and proportionate health responsibilities are realised. In this section, we 
consider how a human rights framing specifically can motivate both practical and normative 
support for law as it impacts public mental health practice, policy, and obligations. It is axiomatic 
that an environment that respects and protects basic civil, political, socio-economic and cultural 
rights is fundamental to mental health. Put conversely, neglect of such rights is neglect of duties 
concerning mental health and well-being. This logically suggests that a powerful alliance is found 
between human rights advocacy and mental health promotion, with compelling implications for 
the obligations of governmental and other socio-political actors. 
 
Many scholars, from across fields, have identified that human rights are universal norms which 
are powerful tools in advancing the rights of vulnerable persons and groups. Gostin et al. argue 
that, unlike some ethical principles or standards, human rights “are internationally recognized 
and globally accepted… and governments have agreed to be legally bound to upholding 
[them.]”75 Moreover, by defining rights-holders, duty-holders, and the nature of obligations, 
human rights frameworks “allow a much clearer opportunity to establish accountability (typically 
of government) for the realization of rights and creates a range of mechanisms to hold 
governments accountable”, as well as “offering a framework for pro-active development of 
policies and programs such that health objectives can be operationalized in ways that are 
consistent with human rights.”76 
 
Nevertheless, historically there has been scepticism about the relationship between public health 
and human rights.77 By focusing predominantly on individuals and processes, human rights 
approaches may be viewed as conceptually and theoretically contrary to, or in tension with, the 
collective or population approaches that are central to public health.78 Such a view might seem 
particularly sustainable within an English context, given that domestically-justiciable human 
rights, enforceable against public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998, are classically 
conceived as civil and political (‘negative’) rights. However, more recent developments in rights 
instruments, discourse, and methodologies have witnessed a more nuanced and ‘positive’ 
approach, and a shift towards tackling wider health inequalities.79 In the early days of public 
health ethics,80 there were notable examples of human rights being used successfully: in 
particular, in relation to HIV.81 Such examples prompted a move to: 
 
                                                 
74 Above n. 71, p. 11. 
75 Lawrence O. Gostin et al, The Domains of Health Responsiveness – A human rights analysis (Geneva: WHO Health and 
Human Rights Working Paper Series No 2, 2003), p. 4. 
76 Leslie London, ‘What is a human rights based approach to health and does it matter?’ Health and Human Rights 
(2008) 10:1, 65-80, 68. 
77 A notable example, given his more recent advocacy, is found in: Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘Public Health, Ethics, and 
Human Rights: A tribute to the late Jonathan Mann,’ Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (2001) 29, 121-130. 
78 Cf Marcel Verweij and Angus Dawson, ‘The Meaning of “Public” in “Public Health”,’ in Angus Dawson and 
(Marcel Verweij (eds), Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
79 Kumanan Rasanathan, Johanna Norenhag and Nicole Valentine, ‘Realizing human rights-based approaches for 
action on the social determinants of health,’ Health and Human Rights (2010) 12:2, 49-59, 49. 
80 Nancy Kass, ‘Public Health Ethics: From Foundations and Frameworks to Justice and Global Public Health,’ 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (2004) 32:2, 232-242. 
81 Jonathan M. Mann, ‘Medicine and Public Health, Ethics and Human Rights,’ Hastings Center Report (1997) 27:3, 6-
13. 
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[R]ethink how population approaches to health can respond to public health crises based 
on inequalities and exclusion, and has led us to devise new ways to integrate human rights 
into public health.82 
 
In accordance with this outlook, Paul Hunt, former UN Special Rapporteur for Health, argues 
that advancements in rights-based approaches since the turn of the new millennium have moved 
the focus away from processes and civil/political rights, to a more contextual and less 
individualised approach.83 For some, ‘greater attention has been brought to negative health 
outcomes, and the terrain of human rights increasingly intersects with the social determinants of 
health’.84 This more recent and gradual change in perspective in the context of public health and 
human rights is to be contrasted with the longer standing and more highly discernible 
relationship between mental health and human rights. Gostin and Gable have described the 
symbiotic relationship between human rights and mental health, characterising them as “mutually 
reinforcing”, and both “powerful, modern approaches to advancing human well-being”.85 
English mental health law has been heavily influenced and shaped by human rights over the last 
three decades. However, this may be represented as basing itself in the antagonism between 
individual rights and collective good that we have just suggested historically was seen to set 
human rights and public health apart. Human rights’ historical links to mental health may be 
seen as obtaining in large part in protection of civil and political rights; individuals’ ‘negative’ 
freedoms against undue state (or state-sanctioned) interference. 
 
Amongst key examples to support this claim, consider that a successful challenge in the 
European Court of Human Rights resulted in key changes to procedural safeguards in the then 
Mental Health Bill, as it passed through Parliament in the early 1980s.86 Or note that one of the 
first declarations of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act related to a 
provision of the Mental Health Act 1983.87 That things should be framed thus is unsurprising: 
these legal challenges are rooted in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), where 
conceptualisations of rights are, as indicated above, focused on individual and process driven 
safeguards.88 But does this mean that a public mental health approach would be bound to fail? We 
would argue not. Bartlett et al., in their book Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, describe how “mental disability has come of age as a subject of concern under the 
ECHR”, but these rights are “only the starting point”.89  There are clear signs, since the 
introduction of the CRPD, that human rights protection is now moving towards a broader 
conception of rights and positive entitlements in the context of mental impairment and 
disability.90 As noted in paragraph (y) of the CRPD’s preamble: 
                                                 
82 London, ‘What is a human rights based approach to health and does it matter?’ above n. 76, 66. 
83 Paul Hunt, ‘The health and human rights movement: Progress and obstacles,’ Journal of Law and Medicine (2008) 
15:5, 714-724. See also WHO, A human rights approach to health (Geneva: WHO, 2010). See also Office for the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(Art. 12) (OHCHR, 2000). 
84 Rasanathan et al, Realizing human rights-based approaches for action on the social determinants of health, above 
n. 79. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See X v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 188. 
87 JT v UK [2000] ECHR 133. 
88 See for example Genevaa Richardson, ‘The European Convention and mental health law in England and Wales: 
moving beyond process?’ International Journal of Law and Psychiatry (2005) 28, 127-139; Phil Fennell and Urfan Khaliq, 
‘Conflicting or complementary obligations? The UN Disability Rights Convention, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and English Law,’ European Human Rights Law (2011) 6, 662-674;  
89 International Studies in Human Rights Volume 90, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) p. 28 
90 See for example Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Mental Health Law,’ (2012) 75(5) Modern Law Review 752-778; George Szmukler et al, ‘Mental health law and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,’ (2014) 37 International Journal of Law & Psychiatry 245-252; 
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[A] comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the rights 
and dignity of persons with disabilities will make a significant contribution to redressing 
the profound social disadvantage of persons with disabilities and promote their 
participation in civil, political, economic, social and cultural spheres with equal 
opportunities, in both developing and developed countries. 
 
Overall, the CRPD aims for the eradication of barriers for persons with disabilities to “full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”91 Of necessity, this requires the 
implementation of ‘positive’ measures. Article 4(2) of the Convention provides, furthermore, 
that: “With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party undertakes to take 
measures to the maximum of its available resources[…].” And Article 9, for example, enumerates 
specific obligations for provision of means to ensure accessibility to “enable persons with 
disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects in all aspects of life.” In line 
with the wider developments in human rights discourse, the paradigm under the CRPD has 
shifted away from the medical model in mental health, to a social model founded on all persons 
as rights-holders. 
 
As we move to such framings, with the consequent inclusion of social, economic, and cultural 
claims, human rights frameworks represent a source of important levers to address health 
inequalities, promote positive well-being, and create healthier societies.92 Our primary 
jurisdictional focus within this paper is England, but we might note that in Scotland human 
rights approaches, framed by reference to the human right to health, are gaining strong social 
and political purchase (including through NHS Health Scotland) in public health advocacy and 
agendas.93 There are real opportunities to learn from the Scottish experience, and harness it along 
with the potential of the CRPD. This would expose the potential for law to bind together ethical 
public and mental health approaches, and shift the focus to tackling ill mental health and health 
inequalities in way that is consistent with the position embraced by the current United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Health.94 His 2017 report on the right to health reinforces the need for a 
‘paradigm shift’, moving away from biomedical and paternalistic approaches, towards a rights-
based and holistic approach to the care and governance of mental health: 
 
Population-based approaches to mental health promotion move health systems beyond 
individualized responses towards action on a range of structural barriers and inequalities 
(social determinants) that can negatively affect mental health.95 
 
The report recognises, however, that population-level approaches do not work in isolation. 
Another critical strand of a human rights approach is recognising the need for empowerment 
                                                 
Penny Weller, ‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the social model of health: new 
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91 UNCRPD, Article 1. 
92 Paul Hunt and Gunilla Backman, ‘Health systems and the right to the highest attainable standard of health’ Health 
and Human Rights (2008) 10:1, 81-92, 81. 
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and effective agency to address the conditions that create vulnerability.96 It is essential for 
individuals and their families to be legally empowered and be able to hold governments to 
account. Thus, what we refer to as a ‘holistic’ approach is needed; an approach that combines 
individualist framing of rights with collective/public ones. And to be effective, as emphasised, 
these require sound and effective developments in law and policy. 
 
3.3 The Dementia ‘epidemic’: a case study 
 
Dementia provides a pertinent example to demonstrate the essential place of law, and the 
soundness of a public mental health approach that is framed by reference to human rights. It 
exposes the need to move beyond responsive interventions and ‘negative’ individual rights, and 
beyond the narrow medical law paradigms and conceptual antagonisms and binaries, to recognise 
the value of proactive and preventive approaches. 
 
Dementia is a leading cause of death in the UK.97 The Alzheimer’s Society suggests that 850,000 
people are currently living with dementia in this country, and that number is projected to 
increase to 2 million by 2050.98 Globally, the number of people living with dementia will increase 
from 50 million in 2018 to 152 million in 2050 – an increase of 204%.99 The WHO estimates that 
the global number of deaths from dementia will increase by 40% from 2015 to 2030.100 These 
figures suggest that we are on the verge of a global dementia epidemic.  
 
Dementia can be described as: 
 
[A] clinical state where a decline in cognitive function, such as loss of memory, judgment, 
language, complex motor skills and other intellectual functions, leads to a decline in 
independent daily function.101 
 
It is a recognised psychiatric disorder, included in both the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV-TR), and the WHO 
International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) criteria.102 Dementia results in a progressive 
decline of multiple areas of function, including memory, reasoning, and communication skills. 
This decline may be accompanied by psychological and behavioural symptoms, such as 
depression and psychosis. Persons with dementia may, at varying stages throughout the 
progression of the condition, require treatment that must be authorised under mental health or 
capacity legislation, due to the nature of dementia and its impact on cognitive function and 
decision-making ability. 
 
The causes of dementia are multi-faceted. Many do stem from genetic factors, but it is 
increasingly recognised that ‘lifestyle’ and environment provide major risk factors.103 Alzheimer’s 
Research UK data suggest that 40% of people would adopt a healthier life style to reduce their 
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risk of dementia.104 Several studies have suggested a link between mentally stimulating leisure 
activities and a reduced risk of dementia.105 Indeed, National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) guidance to healthcare providers in England explicitly recognises that 
individuals can adopt approaches in mid-life, such as reducing alcohol consumption, stopping 
smoking, being more active, and adopting a healthier diet, in order to delay or prevent the onset 
of dementia and disability in later life.106 And Public Health England’s five-year strategy in 2014 
identified reducing the risk, incidence, and prevalence of dementia in people aged 65-75 as one 
of its key priorities.107 
 
In accordance with the discussion above in section 3.1, public perceptions of dementia are a 
significant contributing factor for effective management and treatment.108 This is referred to as 
‘mental health literacy’,109 and various studies from across the globe have demonstrated the 
correlation between public/lay beliefs concerning dementia, stereotyping, and help-seeking.110 
There is evidence to suggest that, despite increased awareness, many people still have relatively 
poor levels of knowledge about the causes, symptoms, and treatments.111 Furthermore, people 
with the Alzheimer’s disease ‘label’ report that they experience increased stigma.112  
 
A report by the WHO and Alzheimer’s International, entitled Dementia: A Public Health Priority,113 
recognises that ‘although dementia mainly affects older people, it is not a normal part of ageing,’ 
as it is a condition which develops, and is caused by several different factors and illnesses of the 
brain. Carers, relatives, and persons with dementia have unique insights into their condition and 
life, and should be central to formulating policies, laws, and decision making and services that 
relate to them.114 However, evidence suggests that many people with dementia either do not 
                                                 
104 https://www.dementiastatistics.org/statistics/attitudes-to-dementia/, accessed 13 December 2018. 
105 See for example Hui-Xin Wang, Weili Xu and Jin-Jing Pei, Leisure Activities, Cognition and Dementia (2012) 
Biochimica et Biophyscia Acta (BBA) – Molecular Basis of Disease, 1822:3, 482-491;  Joe Verghese et al, Leisure Activities 
and the risk of Dementia in the Elderly (2003) The New England Journal of Medicine, 348, 2508-2516; Colette 
Fabrigoule et al, Social and Leisure Activities and Risk of Dementia: A prospective longitudinal study (1995) Journal 
of the American Geriatrics Society 43:5, 485-490. 
106 NICE Guideline [NG16] Dementia, disability and frailty in later life – mid-life approaches to delay or prevent onset (London, 
October 2015).  
107 Public Health England, From evidence into action: opportunities to protect and improve the nation’s health (London, 23 
October 2014). 
108 Perla Werner, ‘Common Perceptions of Dementia,’ in Charles Foster et al (Eds.), The Law and Ethics of Dementia 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018). 
109 Anthony F. Jorm et al, ‘“Mental Health Literacy”: A survey of the public’s ability to recognise mental disorders 
and their beliefs about the effectiveness of treatment,’ Medical Journal of Australia (1997) 166, 182-186. 
110 See for example  W J Tan et al, The lay public’s understanding and perception of dementia in a developing Asian 
nation (2012) Dementia and other Geriatric Cognitive Disorders 2, 433-444;  VG Wadley and WE Haley, ‘Diagnostic 
attributions versus labelling: Impact of Alzheimer’s disease and major depression diagnoses on emotions, beliefs, 
and helping intentions of family members,’ Journals of Gerontology (2001) 56:4, 244-252; Monica Cations etc al, What 
does the general public understand about prevention and treatment of dementia? A systematic review of population 
based surveys (2018) 13:4 PLoS ONE, located at 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0196085, accessed 13 December 2018.  
111  John M. Hudson et al, ‘Beliefs about Alzheimer’s disease in Britain’ Aging and Mental Health (2012) 16:7, 828-835. 
112 VG Wadley and WE Haley, ‘Diagnostic attributions versus labelling: Impact of Alzheimer’s disease and major 
depression diagnoses on emotions, beliefs, and helping intentions of family members,’ Journals of Gerontology (2001) 
56:4, 244-252; Naheed Mukadam and Gill Livingston, ‘Reducing the stigma associated with dementia: approaches 
and goals,’ Aging Health (2012) 8, 377-386. 
113 (2012) located at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/75263/9789241564458_eng.pdf;jsessionid=6ACB2D62C2CDC
E3A8567F0B0F68DAA49?sequence=1, accessed 13 December 2018. 
114 Ibid. p. 4. 
  19 
receive basic care to which they are entitled, or are subjected to restraint and highly coercive care 
practices.115 As the WHO states: 
 
It is widely recognized that people with dementia are frequently denied the basic rights 
and freedoms available to others. In many countries physical and chemical restraints are 
used extensively in aged-care facilities and acute-care settings, even when regulations are 
in place to uphold the rights of people to freedom and choice. The majority of people 
who are restrained have cognitive impairment.116 
 
This clearly suggests a need for an appropriate and supportive legislative environment, based on 
human rights standards, as an important tool to promote the highest levels of care and service 
provision for people with dementia. In addition, we need to look at how appropriately law serves 
the needs of persons with dementia outside of institutional and acute-care situations. 
 
Focusing on England, the government has attempted to address some of the deficits identified. 
At a policy level, the 2010-15 coalition government developed a dementia strategy with the aim 
of providing a framework for addressing health inequalities relating to dementia and dementia 
services.117 This was followed in 2015 by then Prime Minister David Cameron’s Challenge on 
Dementia, with a vision for targeted action and implementation by 2020.118 The plan included 
training for NHS staff on dementia, meaningful care for everyone diagnosed with dementia, and 
equal access to diagnosis. The current Conservative government announced in May 2018 that it 
is reviewing the Challenge on Dementia plan to reflect on progress and what further action is 
needed to meet the objectives,119 as we are still a long way from realising many of the goals set 
out in the 2020 Challenge.  Successive governments’ dementia policies have faced some criticism 
for not going far enough,120 and there are further concerns that dementia has not been included 
in the recent NHS spending priorities.121  
 
Law is not being used to its full potential here. Existing legal responses to provide treatment and 
care in England are centred primarily on the MHA and Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), which 
are highly responsive, protective and coercive; albeit, as noted above, the Care Act regulates 
social care in a community, as opposed to a healthcare, setting. The MHA, as explained above, is 
reactive. It is deeply paternalistic and takes little account of the views of the individual patient or 
family/carers.122 Notwithstanding its empowering aims and ethos, there are significant challenges 
to applying the MCA’s determination of capacity and welfare approach to people with dementia. 
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For instance, there are tensions in disentangling persons’ past and present wishes (as required in 
application of the ‘best interests’ standard under section 4), and the capacity test is 
individualised—‘decision-specific’—and thereby focused heavily on immediate processes of 
cognition.123 It provides binary distinctions that are rooted in functional mental competences, 
and which are not suited to decision-making of persons with conditions such as dementia. As 
such, Mary Donnelly has argued that “the law must address issues raised by dementia on their 
own terms and not simply as a subset of a broader capacity/incapacity agenda”.124 In several 
respects, current regulatory frameworks in England are crude and inappropriate for individuals 
with dementia.125 They focus on reactive biomedical models and ignore social/external factors 
and determinants, as well as the need to promote individual agency within a broader, more 
relational, ‘community’ framework.126 A broader reaching network of supports and interventions 
that respect and honour persons’ rights, as explained above, is what is required. 
 
Investing in evidence-based public health measures and associated regulatory responses could 
have a measurable impact, as a recent Lancet Commission report on dementia in England has 
highlighted.127 It is imperative to act now in order to transform society and “vastly improve living 
and dying”128 for individuals with dementia. As the WHO and Alzheimer’s International 
recommends, we must develop responses across sectors and disciplines, which maximise agency, 
as well as prevention and protection for individuals, families and communities: 
 
It is essential that rights are recognized, respected and protected in order to empower 
people with dementia, those who support them and the community as a whole. An 
appropriate and supportive legislative environment is also required to ensure the highest 
quality of service provision to people with dementia and their caregivers.129  
 
Such recognition of the need for a supportive legislative environment accords with our analysis 
in this paper. In Part 2, we demonstrated the inadequacies of the over-atomised individual of 
medical law, and indeed general conceptualisation around the figure of ‘the (autonomous) 
patient’. In explaining these inadequacies, we noted the challenges rooted in relationality of 
persons, and the need to move within rights framings to more robust and realisable ‘positive’ 
rights. The consequent discussions in Part 3, in particular on the need for real and practicable 
effect being given to the protection of socio-economic rights (as re-enforced through the 
CRPD), have shown why law is essential to providing the conditions for people’s enjoyment of 
good mental health: political commitment is necessary, but alone demonstrably inadequate.  
 
Legal frameworks that are truly empowering require to be able, in practice, actually to 
accommodate the nature of the persons that they govern: this is not just about conceptualising a 
‘patient’, and will not adequately be provided without tests and standards that are fitting given 
the impact and effect of dementias. They equally must be able to accommodate the relevant 
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social concerns, allowing for informal as well as formal provision of care, economic realities, and 
the roles and responsibilities of myriad public, private, and community actors. The task is vast, 
and ambitious. If health law is to make the contributions that are required of it, it needs to match 
that ambition. 
 
4. Conclusions: Public Mental Health Law and the Future of Health Law Scholarship 
 
Health Law as a field of study and of practice has grown enormously over the past decades. 
Looking towards the coming decades, we see necessary value in securing this expansion. Health 
lawyers are crucial partners in work across sectors, and in securing legal support and constraint 
on questions of policy, practice, and personal health and well-being. It is essential, as explained in 
this paper, that we move beyond paradigms that emerged in medical law, or even health care law. 
We are interested in actors across society, and empowering concepts of law that do not just 
protect narrow, ‘negative’ rights. We need to harness legal levers that support positive claims to 
socio-economic goods. And in so doing, we need frameworks that provide normative as well as 
practical authority (and security) to such claims. Health law must be considered as more than 
holding strengths as a reactive or defensive force. 
 
As an important component of this agenda, we have in this paper presented an account of public 
mental health law; an agenda whose time is now, and which requires active, positive engagement 
between law and other fields. The vision that we have advocated for underscores the crucial role 
for human rights for academic and activist activities. We are witnessing a global crisis in mental 
health. Traditional responsive measures are not effective in combating it. We need to 
reinvigorate the debate, move to a new way of thinking, and put prevention of ill health and 
promotion of well-being at the heart of our response. Public mental health law will assist us to 
move towards that goal. And human rights can provide us with a universal and workable 
analytical framework to do so. As Gostin and Gable argue: 
 
The various systems for the protection of human rights present the opportunity to provide 
tangible human rights protection for persons with mental disabilities at both the individual 
and population level…. Human rights are not a panacea for persons with mental 
disabilities. Nevertheless, more focused attention on the civil and political, as well as social 
and economic rights of this group is vitally important.130 
 
Discourse around the right to health and ECHR rights will be crucial motivating factors. And the 
CRPD undoubtedly has a valuable role to play in shifting the paradigm and combating the 
underlying determinants of mental ill health and disability. The time is ripe for relevant 
stakeholders to explore the evidence base and prioritise mental health promotion and illness 
prevention. As the WHO has recognised in a report on Prevention of Mental Disorders: Effective 
Interventions and Policy Options: 
 
Limitations on the basic human rights of vulnerable individuals and communities may act 
as powerful determinants of mental disorders. Hence it is not surprising that many of the 
effective preventive measures are harmonious with principles of social equity, equal 
opportunity and care of the most vulnerable groups in society. 131 
 
                                                 
130 Lawrence O. Gostin and Lance Gable, ‘The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global 
Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health,’ Maryland Law Review (2004) 63, 20. 
131 (Geneva: WHO, 2004). 
  22 
The science of public mental health is well understood; the art, less so.132 We have explained here 
the foundations of law’s contribution to debate and practice. This is an ambitious research 
agenda, and one whose practical importance cannot be overstated. 
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